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1. Introduetion
Congestionseverelyaffectsmostmetropolitan areasaroundthe world. Numerous instru-
ments to tackle congestionhave been studied in the past: electronic road pricing, fuel
taxation, regulatory parking policies, improving public transport, and so on. Another
instrument,widelyviewedto be ableto relievepartof the congestionproblem,is the use
ofnew informationtechnologies in transport networks (theDRIVEland II programmes
ofthe EuropeanCommunity andtheIntelligent Vehicle Highway Systems(IVHS)efforts
in theUnitedStatesareexamples). Informationprovisiontodriversis believedtoimprove
theirknowledgeofthe trafficsituationontheroadsandthusto improvedrivers' decision-
making (Ben-Akivaet al., 1991; Bonsall. 1992). Unfortunately, the real picture of the
effects of information provision to drivers is less clear than such intuitive reasoning
suggests.Atanaggregatelevel,theimproveddecision-making mightimplythatinforma-
tion will direct traffic flows to the user equilibrium (Emmerinket al., 1995a;Wardrop,
1952),in otherwords,a situationcharacterised bydriveroptimaldecisions. However,the
inequality between Wardrop's first (user equilibrium) and second (system optimum)
principles in congestedsituations (Sheffi, 1985) indicates that informationprovided to
drivers need not direct the traffic flows towards the system optimum, that is, the most
effective use of the transport network. This potential discrepancy arises because of the
existenceofthe congestionexternality. This observation leaves the interesting(and still
open) question: to what extent is Information able to improve network efficiency, and
hence to diminish the externalcosts causedby trafficcongestion?
In the literature,sparseattention has beenpaidto thisquestion. Mostpapersuseeither
a simulation approach to infer conclusions on networkefficiency (El Sanhouri, 1994;
Emmerinket al., 1995b; Mahmassani and Jayakrishnan, 1991)or an empiricaI analysis
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in which the impacts of information on drivers' individual behaviour is studied (Caplice
and Mahmassani, 1992; Conquest et al., 1993; Emmerink, Nijkamp, Rietveld and Van
Ommeren, 1994; Mannering et al., 1994; Spyridakis et al., 1991; Van Berkum and Van
Der Mede, 1993).
The objective ofthis paper is to enhance insight into the welfare economie effects of
information provision to a group of drivers, and to gain insight into the meehanisms
affecting the impact of providing information. We will do so by theoretically analysing
the impact of information provision on network efficiency. In addition, we will consider
the equity aspects ofinformation provision by answering questions such as "who benefits
(or disbenefits) most from information?" and "do uninformed drivers also benefit?" To
study these questions, we will eontine ourselves to the economie fundamentals of
information provision and therefore limit the analysis to using simple economie equilib-
rium models rather than complex equilibrium assignment models, Although the latter can
he extremely useful, particularly in the well-known four-stage transport model (Ortüzar
and Willumsen, 1994), they are less appropriate for our purpose, since the complexity of
these models may prevent us from obtaining clear insight into the key fundamentals of
information provision.
The model presented here is a static economie equilibrium model, allowing for elastic
demand, An increasing cost curve represents the costs for travel (including congestion
costs). In particular, the elasticity ofdemand distinguishes our approach from the existing
literature on information provision. The equilibrium models reported on in the literature
generally assume that demand is fixed or inelastic (Al-Deek and Kanafani, 1993; Arnott
et al., 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994; Tsuji et al., 1985). As will be shown in this paper, the
assumption of inelastic demand is a severe limitation of the analysis of information
provision, because changes in use due to changes in costs are then ignored. In the past,
Ben-Akiva et al. (1986) studied an elastic demand versionofVickrey' s (1969) bottleneck
model, as did Amott et al. (1993). The current paper is complementary to their work since
it adds (a) information provision to drivers, and (b) stochasticity in terms of link travel
costs. The latter point has not been given much attention in the literature, but proves to he
important in a driver information systems context.
The paper is organised as follows. To provide the necessary background, Section 2
compares the traditional equilibrium concepts with the methodology proposed in this
paper. Next, in Section 3, the general model is presenred. In Section 4, the impact of
informationprovisionon equity andefticiency is studied. Finally, Section5 contains some
concluding comments and future research directions.
2. Traditional Equilibrium Concepts and the Proposed Methodology
In the 1960s, the classical four-stage (trip generation, distribution, modal split and
assignment) transport model was developed. Despite major improvcments in transport
modelling techniques during the 1970s and 1980s, the basic structure of the model has
remained unaltered (Ortüzar and Willumsen, 1994). The fourth stage of the model -
assigning the origin-destination (00) matrix to the transport network - has usually been
118
Information Provision in Road Transport with Elastic Demand R. H. M. Emmerink et al.
based on Wardrop's (1952) first principle: the user equilibrium. According to this
principle, each user of the network attempts to maximise utility. In the literature, the
standard user equilibrium principle is often referred to as the deterministic user equilib-
rium. A widely recognised restrietion ofWardrop' s concept is that it assumes that all users
of the transport network have full information on the traffic sltuation: something that is
unlikely to happen in practice due to all types of stochastic incidents.
Daganzo and Sheffi (1977) recognised this shorteoming in the deterministic user
equilibrium concept, and introduced the concept of stochastic user equilibrium. This is
defined as a situation in which "no traveller believes that his travel time cao be improved
by unilaterally changing routes" (Sheffi, 1985, p.20). Sheffi and Powell (1981) were the
first to apply rhe stochastic user equilibrium to a relatively simple test network. The
essence ofthe difference between the two equilibrium concepts concerns the difference
between beliefs(user perceptions ofreality) and actualvalues. The discrepancy between
the drivers' perceptions and t.he actual traffic situation would however, disappear by the
provision of perfect information. Therefore, it might be argued that the stochastic user
equilibrium concept distinguishes itself from its deterministic counterpart by allowing for
limited (incomplete) information from the traveller's point of view.
The above mentioned equilibrium concepts have been applied in analysing the impacts
of driver information systems on network efficiency. First, the deterministic user
equilibrium may be viewed as the ideal situation in which all users have perfect
information on the traffic situation. Then, the stochastic user equilibrium characterises a
situation in which drivers are uncertain about route travel costs. The difference between
the two concepts is a measure for the (potential) impacts of driver information systems.
In other words, driver' information systems reduce driver uncertainty, and bring the
stochastic user equilibrium closer to the deterministic user equilibrium. In the past,
different researchers have been using stochastic network assignment models to assess the
impactofdriver information systems on networkperformance (Hicks etal., 1992; Ran and
Boyce, 1994; Tsuji et al., 1985; Van Vuren and Van Vliet, 1992).
It is worthwhile to analyse the souree ofthe uncertainty in the models that are based
on the stochastic user equilibrium concept. In these models, the uncertainty sterns from
modelling the behavioural mechanism underlying the traffic assignment process as a
discrete choice situation. The deterministic user equilibrium then follows under the
assumption that travellers choose the least cost route and, in addition, have full informa-
tion regarding the whole traffic situation. Conversely, stochastic models arise when it is
assumed that, "due to variations in perception and exogenous factors (such as weather,
lighting, and so on) the path times are percei ved differently byeach driver" (Sheffi, 1985,
p.272). Put differently, the intrinsic path travel times may well heconstant in these models,
but it is the case that drivers have different perceptions of them,
These two concepts are given in the first row ofTable 1. The traditional deterministic
and stochastic userequilibrium concepts are characterised as models in which the network
is assumed to be deterministic, while the beliefs of the drivers (the assumed knowledge
of the travellers) may either be according to reality (full information and therefore
deterministic) or subjective perceptions (limited inf<?rmation and therefore stochastic).
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Table 1
Combination ofFeatures ofNetwork and Individual Characteristics
AssumedKnowledgeofTraveller
Network Characteristics
Deterministic
Stochastic
Full(detenninistic)
DUE
SNDUE
Limited(stochastic)
SUE
SNSUE
Hence, in the traditional OUE(determlntsüc userequilibrium) andSUE(stochastic user
equilibrium) concepts, thestochasticity sterns from thetraveIlers themselves (seethefirst
row of Table 1).
However, as indicated by the second rowof Table 1,one mightadoptan alternative
perspective. Given the large variation in daily travel times witnessed on real road
networks, it is reasonable to assume thatthe routetravel costsare stochastic rather than
deterministic (seealsoMirchandani andSoroush, 1987). In factthisis, forthreereasons,
a natural approach for analysing the impact of driver information systems. First, this
approach acknowledges thatthedailytluctuations in travel costsfordifferent roadusers
arehighlycorrelated, something thatis notconsidered bythetraditional classofmodels.
Second, in this approach non-recurrent congestion is modelled explicitly by using
stochastic route travel costs. Sincedriverinformation systems are viewed as beneûcial
particularly in non-recurrent congested situations, thisis anattractive feature. Third,this
approachallowsustoprovideinformedtraveIlers withrealisations ofthestochastic travel
costs, which is a natural way of modelling information. Consequently, the impact of
information on network performance is modelled asanendogenous resultof thedrivers'
responses to the information provided. Conversely, when the discrepancy between the
DUE and SUE concepts is used as a measure of the impactof information, then it is
assumed that information provision exogenously reduces theuncertainty on thenetwork
situation.
The models in the secondrow of Table 1 are referred to as the stochastic network
deterministic userequilibrium (SNOUE) andstochastic network stochastic userequilib-
rium (SNSUE). In this article, a simple model basedon the SNOUE is discussed.
3. The One-link Equilibrium Model with Stochastic Congestion
In thissection, the model willhe presented inItssimplest form. In this form, the network
is limited to one link only. Clearly, in such a simple network the potentially beneficial
route-split effectsof information provision cannot be analysed, thatis,beneffetal effects
of information provision owing to the fact that informed drivers change route in
120
Information Provision in Road Transport with Elastic Demand R. H. M. Emmerink et al
circumstances ofincidents (see Verhoefet al.,1996, for a simultaneous consideration of
routesplit andmodalsplitin relationto information). Mode-split effectshowever, canhe
addressedin thecurrentcontextandtheseareprecisely theonesthathavepreviously been
ignored in the literature, because of the underlying assumption in most models that
demand is inelastic. Furthermore, in Verhoefet al., (1996) it is shownthat the welfare
implicationsofinformationprovisiononatwo-linknetworkareoftenpraeticaltythesame
as those on a one-link network, with significant differences only occurring at rather
inelasticdemand. Hence, whenstudying elasticdemand a one-linknetworkis sufficient
to provideimportantinsights.
The rest ofthis sectionis structured as follows. In Section3.1, the assumptionsin the
model are presented. In sub-sections 3.2 and 3.3 model P and model N are studied,
respectively. In model P it is assumed that a certaingroupoftravellers is provided with
information, while in model N no information is available. The properties of these two
modelsare exploredin sub-section 3.4.
3.1 Assumptions in the model
In the model,the demandsideis modelled usingtwogroupsof drivers,labelledgroupx
and group y. The inverse demand function for x-travellers is denoted by Dx' and for y-
traveIlers by Dy. Thesefunctions relatethe number ofusers in the networkto total travel
costs.Hence, foralllevelsoftravelcostsxthe totaldemandfunction isbydefinitiongiven
by D-l(lC) = Dx-l(lC) + Dy-l(lC).
Thesupplysideofthe systemismodelled usinglinktravelcostfunctions. It is assumed
that the linktravelcost function haseitherthe functional formCO or Cl, dependingon the
stateof the system. State 1 reflects low capacity congestion occurringwith a probability
p, whilestate0denoteshigh capacitycongestion whichoccurswithaprobabilityl-p. The
distinctionbetweenthesestateslies in the highertravelcosts in state 1, that is, C1(N) ~
CO(N) for all N, whereN denotes the number of drivers using the one-link network. In
addltion, it is assumed that dC1(N)/dN ~ dCO(N)/dN. Consequently, both the travel cost
itself and the rate at whichtravelcost increases arehigherunderstate 1.This increasein
travel costs is caused by random (unpredictable) incidents such as traffic accidents,
suddenlane closures, and so on.
Thisrandomcostcomponent incombination withtheelasticdemandfunctions render
an analysis of the impacts of information provision relevant. To visualise the kind of
informationthatis provided, thebestexampleis pre-tripinformation, as themodelin the
presentpaper is static.Then,without the provision of pre-tripInformatlon, it is assumed
that uninformed driversuse the probability p to determine the expectedcost functionin
the transport system, while informed drivers base their behaviour on the actual cost
functionas they are provided withpre-tripinformation. An informedroad-userwill use
the networkifprivate benefitsare at leastequal to actual privatecosts for the prevailing
stateofthe transportsystem. Anuninformed driverusesthenetworkif privatebenefitsare
at least equal to expected private costs. The equilibrium that is reached in this way
conformstoWardrop's flrstprinciple, theuserequilibrium (Wardrop, 1952), asbothmay
he characterised by individual maximising behaviour.
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(3)
(1)
(2)
To studythe impactof information provision twomodels (modelPand modelN) are
compared. In model P information is provided to the group of x-travellers, while no
informationis providedtoy-travellers. In model N neitherx- nory-travellers aresupplied
with information. Then, a comparison of thesemodels allows us to isolatethe impactof
informationprovisionon both the informed (x) and uninformed (y) travelIers. Further-
more, this gives us the opportunity to study the effects of information on network
performance.
3.2 Model P
In model P, x-travellers are provided with information, whereas y-travellers are not.
Therefore, x-travellers base their behaviour on actual travel costs, whereas y-travellers
use expected travel costs instead.
Transferring the verbally explained equilibrium conditions intomathematical expres-
sionsyieldsmodelPin expressions (1) to (3),whereNp,xo andNp,x1 denotethe numberof
informed(x) driversusingtheone-linknetworkinstate0andstate1,respectively: andNp,y
the number of uninformed (y) drivers. Subscript p (referring to model P) denotes the
equilibriumroad-usevaluesof model P. Equations (1) and (2) ensure that the marginal
informeddriver,thatis, theinformeddriverwhois indifferent betweenusingtheone-link
networkandanalternative (implying zeromarginal netprivatebenefits),equatesmarginal
privatecostsandmarginal privatebeneflts forbothstate0 andstate 1.Ina similarfashion
expression (3) guarantees thatthemarginal uninformed driverexperiences zeroexpected
marginal netprivatebenefits. Forthenon-marginal drivers (expected) netprivatehenefits
are larger than zero, hecause of the downward-sloping demand function. Finally, the
additional conditionthat road use is non-negative has to he imposed, that is, Np,x0, Np,x1
and Np,y have to he greaterthan or equal to zero.
Dx(Hp~) S CO(N:,x + Npty)'N~x ~ 0 and Hp~ e [Dx(Hp°~) - CO(N~x + Npty)] =0
Dx(Hp~) S Cl(Hp~x + HptY)'Hp~x ~ 0 and Np~ e [Dx(Hp~) - Cl(Hp~ + HptY)] =0
Dy(Npty)S (l-p).Co(N~x + HptY) + peCl(N~tx + Hpty),HptY ~ 0 and
Hpty e {Dy{HptY) - [(I-p)eCo{N:~ + ~tY) + peCl(N~x + Npty)]}=0
Intheanalysishelow.Itis assumed thatthegroup-regularityconditionappliesforeach
group, that is, for each state and each group of drivers the network will at least he
marginally used. For a one-link networkthisis a plausible assumption, since it seems
likely that for each state at least some uninformed and informed drivers will use the
network. Imposingthisrestrietion impliesthatmodel equations (1)to (3)canherewritten
to equatlons(4) to (6).
Dx(Hp~)=CO(Hp~ + ~tY) (4)
Dx(Np~)=Cl(Np~ + ~tY) (5)
Dy(Npty)= (l-p)eCo(N:,x + Npty)+ peCl(NJ~ + HptY) (6)
Figure 1 gives a diagrammatic representation for the situation whereCj(N) (j=0,1) is
linear and, in addition, the slopesof the cost functions are identical.
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Figure 1
Equilibrium Model with lnformed and Uninformed Individuals
In the left-hand panel of Figure 1,uninformed drivers (y-travellers) equate expected
marginallink travelcosts to their marginal benefits. In doing so, they take accountofthe
effect that theexpectednumberof informeddrivers(x-traveIlers) willhaveon theircosts.
Given the assumptions on the cost functions, theexpectednumberof uninformeddrivers
can be foundby equatingtheirdemandtoexpectedusercost.' This leads to a totalnumber
of Np,y uninformed individuals using the network. Next, informed drivers shift the
prevailingcost curve Cj (j=O,1)withanamountNp,y to the left (seethe dashedcost curves
in Figure 1) to account for travel denlandof uninformed road users. Then for each state,
the numberof informedroad usersis foundbyequatingdemandwithprevailingcosts (as
given by the dashed cost curve), leading to Np,xo informeddrivers using the network in
state O. andNp.x1 informeddriversin state 1.Underthe assumptions on thecost functions
CO and Cl, it follows that Np,xI is smaller than Np,~\:o: when low capacity prevails, some
informed drivers will not use the car but the other transport mode (or remain at home).
It can easily be demonstrated thatNp,y, Np,x0 andN~,x I are the only equilibriumvalues.
In general, in user equilibrium models it can be shown that the equilibrium link travel
flows are unique(Sheffi, 1985). Conversely, path travelflowsare not unique. In our one-
link networkhowever, a path is equivalentto a link, and hence we witness the similarity
between our result and the literature.
A meaningful graphical illustration is impossible when these conditions (linear 0 U=O, 1] and the same
slope) are not imposed on the cost functions. In such a situation the expectcd cost function (as shown in the
left-hand panel of Figure 1) does not solely depend on E(Np,x) but also on the exact values of Np,x0 and Np,x 1.
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3.3 Model N
Next, the model in which no information is available to bath x- and y-travellers is
investigated. This model is referred to as model N (no information). The equilibrium
valuesof roaduseof modelN arestudiedinorderto assess thewelfareeconomicimpacts
of informationprovision. In model N, bath x- and y-travellers base their behaviouron
expectedtravel costs. The equilibrium conditions of model N are givenin (7) and (8).
DX(N,l,x) s (l-p).eo(~tX + ~tY) +p.C1(N,ltX + ~,y),N,l,x ~ 0 and
Nn,x·{Dx(Nn,x) - [(I-p).eo(~l,x + ~l,y) +p·C1(Nn,x + ~l,y)]}=0
DY(~tY) s (l-p).eo(~,x+ Nn,y) +p-C1(N,l,X + ~,y)' Nn,y ~ 0 and
~,y·{Dy(~,y) - [(I-p).eO(~l,x + ~,y) + p·e1(fi,l,X + N,ltY)]} =0
(7)
(8)
Thesubscriptn (referring to modelN) is usedtodistinguish theequilibrium valuesofthis
modelwith the equilibrium valuesof the model described in subsection 3.1.Expression
(7) shows that the x-travellers now also base theirbehaviour on the expectedlink travel
costs, rather than on the actual link travel costs. By imposing the group-regularity
condition, as definedin the previous section, theseexpressions can be simplifiedto two
equalities.
3.4 Propertjes of models Pand N
In the current section,the properties of the models Pand N specified in subsections 3.2
and3.3areexplored. Inorderto keeptheanalysis manageable andtheoutcomes tractable
wewillassumelineardemandandcostfunctions overtherelevantrangesconsidered(that
is, the rangescontaining the levelsofuse in eachofthe possible statesandin each ofthe
possibleregulatoryregimes). Although theuseoflinear functions mayhe criticised, they
arein anycasesufficienttoservethegeneral goalofthe currentpaper,whichis toenhance
our insight into the welfare economie effects of information provision to a group of
deivers.Furthermore, it mightbe interesting to notethatforinelasticdemandAmottet al.
(1992) have proved that the equilibrium travel cost functions in Vickrey's dynamic
congestion model (Vickrey, 1969) of the morning rush hour with rwo groups and two
parallel routes are specialcasesof our linearcost functions.
An analytical comparison of the model P (in which information is available to x-
travellers, and no information is available to y-travellers) and the model N (in which no
informationis availableto bath x andy-travellers) leads us to the following proposition
for a system with linear demandand cost functions.
Propositiontè
Assuming linear demand us., Dy) and cost (CO, Cl) functions and el(N) ~ eO(N) and
dC1(N)ldN ~ dCJ(N)ldN, then the following relationships hold:
2 Proof of this proposition is available from the authors on request.
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• expected roaduseincreases due to information:
Nn,x + Nn,y S Np,y + (l-p)Np,xO + pNp,x1;
• roaduse in state0 increases due to information:
Nn,x + Nn,y S Np,y + Np,xo, henceC1(Nn,x+NIJ,y) S CJ(Np,y+ Np,xo);
• roaduse in state1 decreases due to information:
Nn,x + Nn,y ~ Np,y + Np,x1, henceCl (Nn,x+ Nn,y) ~ cl(Np,y + Np,x1) ;
• expected link travel costsdecrease due to information:
(l-p)CJ(Nn,x+ Nn,y) +pCl(Nn,x+Nn,y) ~ (l-p)C1(Np,y+Np,xo) + pCl(Np,y+ Np,x l ) ;
• numberofy-travellers increases due to information:
Nn,ySNp,y;
• expected numberofx-travellers increases due to information:
Np,x1 S Nn,x S (l-p)Np.xo + pNp,x1 S Np,xo;
• System welfare in model P exceeds system welfare in model N.
Theproposition hasaninteresting interpretation. It tellsus thatinformation increases
theexpectedroaduse forboththedrivers withandwithout information. However, at the
sametime the expected travel costsin the network willdecrease. Hence, an increasein
expeeted road use is achieved while expected network travel costs have deereased.
Therefore, system welfare, measured as thesumof individual benefits minusthe sumof
individual costs, increases due to information (ignoring the cost of providing the
.information). Thisresultsterns from thefactthat-whenprovided withinformation -more
road users will use the network when it is relatively cheap (state 0 oceurs), while less
informed drivers will use it when it is relatively expensive (state 1 oceurs). Moreover,
knowing thatinformed drivers behave in thisfashion, more uninformed driverswillalso
findit profitable to usethe network, because theinformed drivers willrelievepartof the
eongestion under high cost cireumstances (state 1 occurs). However, it is important to
notieethat link travel costsin state0 arehigherwiththan without information, whiehis
a directconsequence of the second pointin the proposition. Nevertheless, the expected
link travel costs are smaller wheninformation is provided.
The proposition also shows the relevanee of using elastie rather than fixed denland
patterns. Asshownin theproposition, Informaüon doesin factalterthe systemperferm-
aneeevenin aone-link network. Underfixed (inelastic) demand, however, it is elearthat
informatlon does not affect the performance of the system since, independent of the
prevailing link travel cost function, the same number of drivers will always use the
network.
Eventhoughthe aboveresults are appealing, the merits of information provision for
governments' policypurposes shouldbe basedon changes in social welfare rather than
on some(derived)performance indicator, suehasexpected roaduseorexpeeted network
travel costs. Social welfare, measured by the total system benefits minus me total
(expected) system costs,isthemost appropriate criteriononwhichtojudgethenetwork's
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performancein termsof efficiency. Eventhoughthe proposition showsthat information
provisionincreases systemwelfarein our simplemodel, it is worthwhile to analyse: (1)
the relativesize ofthis welfareImprovement; and (2) whichtraveIlers benefitmost from
theinformation. Thelatterissue,alsoreferredtoasanequityissue,ishighlyrelevantwhen
analysingthe politicalfeasibility ofpolicy measures. Policiesthathavea strongeffecton
the currentequity situationare likely to provokeresistance. In Section4 these issues are
addressed.
4. Efficiency and Equity Issues of Information
The welfare economie aspects of information provision are studied here using the
previously specified modelsP andN. A link travel cost function C without superscript
denotes the expected link travel costs, that is, C =(1-p)CO + pCI. BYsubstituting the
results obtained from the proposition in the respective link travel costs functions, the
following relationshipfor the equilibrium link travelcasts is derived:
C~ ~ C~ s Cp s c,~ C~ ~ C,~ (9)
These link travelcost functions obviously have to be evaluatedat their relevantequilib-
rium levels of trip demand, for exampleC;°denotes Cllo(Nll•y + Nll•x)'
In subsection4.1, the questionof whichtravellers benefitmost from the information
is analysed(the equity issue). In subsection 4.2, the relativesizeof the welfareimprove-
ment due to Information provision is studied(the efficiency issue).
4.1 Information and equity
4.1.1 Informeddrivers (x-travellers)
The situationfor theinformeddriversis schematically depictedin Figure2. In this figure,
D, gives the demandcurve, whilethe horizontallinesdenotedCgiveequilibriumvalues
of costs, and hence should not mistakenly he seen as cast curves.
WhenstateOoccurs, thenNn,xis less thanorequal toNp,xo and C"o is less thanorequal
to Cp0. This situationisdepictedin the left-handpanelofFigure 2.Thedriverson theleft-
hand side of Nn,x will alwaysuse the networkunderstateO. With information provision,
their link travel costs willbe larger than in the absence of information. Hence,in state 0,
these drivers suffer a cost disadvantage that is equal to the size of Cp°minus C;0, and is
given by the shaded rectangle. It is interesting to note that this cost disadvantageis an
increasing congestion externality, sinceit is causedby the fact that other road-usersare
informed.The sizeofthis negativeexternaleffectdecreases as fewerdrivershaveaccess
to the information, since the difference betweenCp°and C"O will then decrease.
For the drivers betweenNn,x andNp,x0, information on the actualoccurrenceof state0
inducesthemtochangetheirbehaviour. Withoutinformation theywillnotusethenetwork
becauseexpectedcostsexceedtheirbenefits, whereas theywillusethenetworkwhenthey
are provided with the information that low costs prevail. The size of the total welfare
improvementfor driversbetweenN",x andNp,x°is equalto l/2(Np.x°-Nll,x)(C;- Cp0) and is
givenbytheshadedareain theleft-handpanelofFigure2.It is importanttonotethat these
welfaregains are internalin nature, sincethesearise from betterdecision-making by the
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Figure 2
Welfare Effects for x-travellers
informed drivers themselves. Therefore, we call these information benefits internal
decision-making benefits. The size ofthe internaldecislon-maklngbenefits decreases as
moredriversareinformed;withmoreinformeddriversthedifferencebetweenCp0 andC"0
will increase, thereby(otherthingsbeingequal)decreasingthedifferencebetween C"and
Cpo. This negativeeffect for alreadyinformeddriversof equippingan additionaldriver is
clearly external in nature. In this state, the marglnallyequippeddriver will gain benefits
fromthe information,whilethe informationbenefitsfor the alreadyequippeddrivers will
dwindle. (See also Emmerink, Nijkamp, Rietveldand Axhausen, 1994, where the same
phenomenon is discussed.)
If state 1occurs, thenNn,x is greater thanor equal to Np,x1, and Cl(Nn,x+ N ll,y) is greater
than or equal to Cl(Np,y +Np,x0). Thesituationis depictedin the right-handpanel ofFigure
2. First, drivers on the left-hand slde of Np,x1 will always use the network. Owing to the
informationprovision, these will incurbenefitsequal to the differencein link travel costs
C;1 minus Cp1. This cost advantageis a decreasing congestion externality, since it arises
from the fact that other road users are provided with Information and they reduce link
travel demand when state 1 occurs. In the right-hand panel of Figure 2 this external
beneficial effect is shown by the large shadedrectangulararea. Second, drivers between
Np,x 1andN",x will, knowingthat state 1occurs,change their traveldecision and avoid the
network. As a consequence,thesedrivers willbenefit trom a cost advantageequal to C1l 1
minus Cp1, and in addition, from a decision-rnaking advantage equal to the size of
lh(Nn,x - Np,x1)(Cp1 - C,,).Noticethat the declsion-maktng advantageis an intemal effect,
while the cost advantage is external in nature. The farmer arises trom the fact that the
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driverhimselfis informedof theprevailing trafflcconditions,notfromthefact thatother
drivers are informed. These two beneficial effects are illustrated in the right-handpanel
of Figure 2 by the black rectangular area (decreasing congestion externality) and the
shadedtriangulararea (decision-making benefits).
In summary, driverson the left-handsideof Np, x1 (thatis, driverswhoalwaysuse the
networkindependentofthe occurring state)willsufferfrom anexternalcostdisadvantage
if state0 occursandanexternalcostadvantage if state1occurs. Drivers betweenN",x and
Np.x0 benefitfrom an internaldecisionadvantage if state0 occurs. Drivers betweenNp.x1
andNn.x incur an externalcost increaseif state0 occurs, andanexternal cost andinternal
decision-making advantage if state 1 prevails. Finally, driversto the right of Np,xonever
usethenetworkandarethereforeindifferent aboutwhethertheyobtaininformationornot.
When we consider the equity aspects of information provision in our model, we can
concludethat no informedindividual is worse off due to information provision. Above,
it wasnoticedthatinformedindividuals ontheleft-handsideofNp, x1areworseoffin state
oand betteroff in state 1. In termsof expectedindividual welfare (net privatebeneûts),
however, thesedriversareatleastaswelloffaswithout information, sinceC; islargerthan
orequalto Cp asstatedintheproposition. Therefore,p( C"1_Cp1) ~ (l-p)(Cp0 - Cn0). Using
the sameargument, it follows that individuals between Np.x1 andNIl,x arealsobetteroff as
they incur the sameexternal cost advantage asdrivers to the left-handsideofNp, x1 andin
addition benefit from an internal decision-making advantage when state 1 occurs.
Informedindividuals betweenNn,x and Np,xoare alsoIndividually betteroff as they gain
when state 0 occurs and are indifferent whenstate 1 occurs. Finally, individuals to the
right-handsideof Np, x0 neverusethenetworkandaretherefore indifferentaboutwhether
theyobtaininformationor not.Therefore, in our modeltheprovision ofinformation will
always lead to a welfare improvement for the group of informed drivers. A typical
individual(expected) welfarepattern(netprivatebenefits) as generatedby the modelis
shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 3. The shadedarea under the bold curve (being
equalto thedifferencebetweenthenetexpectedprivatebenefitsundermodelPand model
N) shows the expectedwelfaregains due to information.
The left-handpanelof Figure3 indicates thatindividuals closetoNll,x gain mostfrom
informationprovision. This is an intuitively appealing result, since individuals close to
.N",x areexactlythosewhoaremostdoubtful aboutwhether or notto usethe network. For
theseindividuals, informationprovisionwillenhance theirknowledge andwillaffecttheir
travel decisions. On the other hand, individuals on the left-hand side of Np, x1 will never
change their travel decisions regardless of the kind of information provided. Thus it is
clear that the information benefitsfor thesedrivers are external in nature, becauseof an
improvednetworkefficiency due to information provision to other individuals. Finally,
individuals who never use the networkhave obviously nothing to gain (or lose) from
informationprovision.
4.1.2 Uninformed drivers(y-travellers)
The situation for the y-travellers is schematically depicted in Figure 4. As before, the
horizontallines denoteequilibrium values forcosts. Firstof all it is important to notethat
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x-travellers y-travellers
Net Private Benefits Net Private Benefits
N
Nn,y' Np,y
Figure3
ExpectedNet Private Bellefits for x- and y-travellers; Model P - Model N
(following the proposition) N",y is smaller than or equal to Np,y' that is, the number of
uninformed driverswillincreasewheninfonnationis provided to others. Thenin state0,
the totalbenefitsminusthetotalcostsforuninformed individuals whennoinformationis
provided is shown by the polygon ABCD in the left-hand panel of Figure 4. When
Information isprovidedto infonnedindividuals, thenthetotalnetbenefitsforuninformed
driversare givenby the polygon AEFG. Hence, in state0, thechangein totalwelfarefor
uninformed drivers,due to information provision to informedindividuals, is equal to the
surfaceofthe shadedpolygonminusthe surface ofthe shadedrectanglein the left-hand
panel of Figure 4.
When the prevailing network condition is state 1, changes in total welfare are as
depictedin theright-hand panelofFigure4.Totalwelfare ofthe uninformed driverswhen
no information is available is given by the area ABC minus the area CDE. When
informationis provlded, total welfare becomes the area AFO minusarea OHI.
As uninformed individuals between Nn,y and Np,y decide to use the network when
informationisprovidedtoinformedindividuals, theywillexperience individualexpected
benefits; if this were not the case, they wouldnot decide to use the networkin the first
pIace. Also, the uninfonned drivers on the left-hand side of Nn,y benefit from the
information provided to informed drivers. This is because expected link travel costs
decreasewheninformation isprovided (ep is smallerthanen; seetheproposition). There-
fore, tnformation provision to informed drivers willalso lead to a welfare improvement
for uninformeddrivers (see also Emmerink, Nijkamp, Rietveld and Axhausen, 1994).
Clearly, these beneficial effects to uninformed drivers are extemal in nature; theyare
inducedby behavioural responses fromother (informed) road users. A typicalexpected
welfarepattern for uninformed driversis shownin the right-hand panel of Figure 3.
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Welfare Effectsfor y-travellers
4.1.3 Summary
In the modelpresentedso far information provision willlead to a strictPareto improve-
ment (ignoring the costs of information provision): both the informed and uninformed
driversare at least as weIl off.Furthermore, dueto the information providedtheexpected
levelof road use willincrease,whiletheexpectedlink travelcostswilldecrease. Finally,
it is worthnotingthat thesebeneficial effectscanin theorybereachedby providing a very
llmlted numberof driverswith informatlon: only drivers betweenNp,x 1 and Np,x0 have to
receiveinformationtoobtaintheresultsdiscussed, becausethesearetheinformeddrivers
whomightchangetheirtravelbehaviour becauseof theinformation ontheprevailinglink
travelcost function. In practice,it is of coursehardto identifythisgroup.In a free market
system with perfect information on the costs and benefits of beingprovidedwith traffic
informationthis groupof drivers wouldidentifythemselves, In this way, the numberof
informedand uninformeddriverswouldbe endogenised (Emmerink, Verhoef,Nijkamp
and Rietveld, 1995). .
4.2 Information and efficiency
In the previous sectionthe importantresultwasobtainedthat information provisionin a
one-link networkleads to a strictParetoimprovement (ignoring the costsof information
provision). In this sectionweaddressthesizeofthis efficiency improvement on the basis
of some experiments. We do so by comparing the effectson total (expected) welfare of
the following three regimes:
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• information provision as studiedin modelP,
• no informationprovision as studiedin modelN, and
• system optimal behaviour.
Under systemoptimalbehaviour, the numberofindividuals using the networkis derived
in such a mannerthat total expectedwelfare, as measuredby total systembenefits minus
total expected system costs, is maximised. It is well known that this can (in theory) be
implemented by meansof a fluctuating congestion-pricing scheme.
Theeffectsof thesethreeregimesonexpectedwelfarearecapturedin theperformance
indicator ro (see Arnott et al., 1991; Verhoef et al., 1995), which in the present paper
indicatestherelativewelfareimprovement ofproviding informationto agroupofdrivers.
The index co is defined as:
Welfare (model P)- Welfare tmodel N)
to =Welfare (System Optimum) - Welfare (model N) (10)
Hence, co gives the achievablewelfaregains as a proportionofthe theoreticallypossible
welfare gains. Clearly, ro cannotexceed the valueone. In addition, ro cannot be smaller
than zero, since it was shownin the previoussectionthat Information provision leads to
a strict Pareto improvement, implyingthat the numeratorof expression (10) cannot take
on negative values.
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For reasons of space, onlythemostinteresting model experiments arepresented. The
experiments havebeenconducted withlinearinverse demand Dj(N) = dj - aJV (j=x,y)and
cast Cm(N) =km+ bmN (nl=0,1) functions. Given the satisfactory results obtainedwith
previously conducted experiments in Verhoefet al. (1994) andVerhoefet al. (1996), the
basecaseparameters weresetequal to ~=50, a]=0.03 (j=x,y), Jéll=20 (nl=0,1), bO=0.015,
b1=0.04 andp=0.25.
Figure5 showsthe impactof changes in theprobability of having lowcapacity on roe
Clearly, if thereis complete certainty on thelinktravel costfunction, thenco fallsto zero
(p=0andp=1).Forvalues inbetween, co reaches amaximum of0.4,depending onthesize
of the low capacity congestion costparameter b', It should be notedthat the probability
for which ro takes on a maximurn is dependent on b', In addition, the value of ro is
surprisingly stableforlargeranges ofp. Forexample, forthecasethatbI is equalto0.04,
ro falls in between0.2 and0.3 whenp is in the interval ranging from 0.15 to 0.70.
Next, the impactof theelasticity of thedemand functions on co is analysed. To do so,
the two demand curves were simultaneously tilted around the original intersection of
model N, varying fromhighelasticities ontheIeft-hand sidetoalmastperfectinelasticity
on the rlght-handside.Thereason forchanging bath a andd parameters (of the demand
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function) simultaneously is to avoidvery (small) large levelsof road use whendemand
approaches complete(in)elasticity.
In Figure6 thex-axisfollows a logarithmic sealing withbasenumber 1.4.The results
shown in Figure 6 indicatethat as demandbecomes less elastic, the welfare-improving
propertiesof information provision flrst increase and then decrease. Apparently, there
exists somelevelof elasticityfor whichco is maximised. Although withalmostinelastic
demand co is still signiflcantly different from zero, the availablewelfare improvement
relative to the total welfareis in thesecircumstances very small; the equilibriumvalues
for the threedifferentmodels contained in the co indexarepractically the same. It can be
noted,however, thatwithmoreroutesavailable, co mayapproachunityatinelasticdemand
due to the beneficial impactof information on routechoice (Verhoefet al., 1996).
Finally, some experiments that focus on the Impact ofthe group size on the relative
efficiencyindicatorco wereconducted. Inordertodoso, the totaldemandcurvewaskept
at thesameposition, whiletherespective demand curvesofthe Informed anduninformed
driverswerevariedfromfewto manyinformed drivers. For thebasecaseparameters, and
the total inversedemandcurveequal to D(N) = 50 - 0.015N, the results are depicted in
Figure 7. The x-axisof this figure presents the percentage of informeddriversusing the
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network; in the literature this is known as the level of market penetration. 3 Figure 7
indicates that the relative efficiency indicator 00 increases as the expected number of
informed drivers increases (hence, as the demand curve of the informed drivers rotates
outwards). However, the concavity ofthe curve demonstrates that this increase takes place
at a decreasing rate. Therefore, from an efficiency point of view (taking the costs of
implementing the technology into account), it might not be optimal to supply all drivers
with the information.
The above observations have shown that the size ofthe welfare-improving properties
of information provision depend on a number of complex interactions between the
probability ofhaving low capacity (P), the impact of such an incident (bI), the elasticity
of demand (aj' j=x,y) , and the respective group sizes. Our experiments suggest that for a
linear system the maximurn achievable welfare gains, expressed as a proportion of the
theoretically possible efficiency gains, will most likely not exceed 0.4. For achievlng
larger values of 00, some form of congestion pricing is inevitabIe. The combination of
congestion-pricing and information is analysed in El Sanhouri (1994), De Palma and
Lindsey (1994) and Verhoef et al. (1996).
5. Concluding Comments
This paper has studied the welfare economie effects of information provision to a group
of drivers. For that purpose an equilibrium model with elastic demand for road use was
used. The model was introduced in a one-link network with stochastic capacity and two
groups of (potential) users, informed and uninformed ones. Informed users base their
decisions on actualprevailing traffic conditions, while uninformed drivers use expected
traffic conditions.
The applied methodology explicitly models the link travel costs as stochastic vari-
ables. This provides a natural means to supply informed drivers with realisations of these
stochastic variables, while uninformed drivers will base their behaviour on expectations
of the stochastic travel costs. This contrasts with most of the prevailing literature, where
it is assumed that the discrepancy between the traditional deterministic and stochastic user
equilibrium is an indicator for the impact of informatlon provision.
It was found that information provision is welfare-improving for both the informed and
uninformed drivers. Hence, information leads in our model to astrict Pareto Improvement
(ignoring the costs of provision). With information provision, the user equilibrium is
nearer to the system optimum. Information provision will, however, not close the gap
between the two concepts. Even when all road users are well informed, the user
equilibrium will still be different from the system optimum, Another interesting result of
the analysis is that information increases expected road use (generating more traffic),
while at the same time decreasing expected link travel costs.
Furthermore, the analysis showed that many of the beneficial effects (and some of the
adverse effects) ofinformation provision are external in nature; they arise from changes
3 Observations below lOper cent market penetration are not available, because these would violate the
group-regularity condition; that is, the network is not marginally used by both x- and y-travellers.
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in trip-making decisions by others. For example, the beneficial effects of information
provision to uninformeddrivers are clearly extemal in nature. They arise from behav-
ioural adaptations by the informeddrivers, rather than from changes in travel decisions
by the uninformedroadusers. Theexistence of theseexternaleffectsraises aninteresting
questionaboutgovernments' rolein introducing thesetechnologies. It is weIl knownthat
withoutpropergovernmentintervention,external effectsdistortthemarketmechanism.and
result in an inefficientallocation of scarceresources.
In contrast to most of the literature on the impacts of information provision, our
equilibriummodelallowsforelasticdemand. Indoingthis,weacknowledgetheimportant
economierelationshlp betweendemandandsupply.Theresultsin thispaperindicatethat
the elasticity of demand is an important factor in determining the welfare-improving
propertiesof information provision. Information was foundto be less useful at both low
and high levels of demandelasticity.
The analysisin thispaperwasconfinedtoperfectinformation to informeddriversand
a one-link network. Clearly, theseareseriousrestrictions. In futureresearch,the issue of
imperfectinformationandmoregeneralnetworks deserves moreattention. It is important
to obtain greater understanding of the influence of the quality of the information on
networkefficiency,sinceit isunrealistic toassumethatrouteguidancedeviceswillbeable
to provide perfect information. Finally, moregeneralnetworks wouldallow us to study
so-ca1led route-spliteffects (in addition to DIode split effects).
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